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Abstract 
 
In communication, information, and other industries, three-part tariffs are becoming increasingly 
popular. A three-part tariff is defined by an access price, a usage allowance, and a marginal price 
for any usage in excess of the allowance. The nonlinear-pricing literature has focused primarily 
on two-part tariffs. We show that consumer behavior differs under three-part tariffs, in particular 
regarding the impact of consumers’ usage uncertainty on tariff choice. We develop a 
discrete/continuous model of tariff choice among three-part tariffs and estimate the model using 
consumer-level data on Internet usage. By allowing consumers to switch from their current 
provider to a competitor, we model behavior in competitive industries. Our results show that 
demand uncertainty is a key driver of choice between three-part tariffs. For a given tariff and 
average usage, the expected bill increases with the variation in consumer demand, steering 
consumers towards tariffs with high usage allowances. Consequently, demand uncertainty 
decreases consumer surplus and increases provider revenue. In addition, we analyze consumers’ 
responsiveness to the different elements of a three-part tariff. We find that the access price is the 
main driver of consumer tariff choice, whose effects dominate any sensitivity to the usage price 
or the allowance. Based on our results we derive implications for pricing with three-part tariffs.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing, Discrete/Continuous Choice Model, Internet Access, Three-Part Tariffs, 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, firms in a number of industries have introduced wide menus of 
pricing plans that grant access to virtually identical products under different pricing 
schemes. For services such as landline telephone and electricity, consumers generally 
choose between two-part tariffs that differ in their access and usage prices. Three-part 
tariffs are, however, becoming increasingly popular for communication services (wireless 
phone service, Internet access), subscription services (online music download, online 
newspapers), or car rental. A three-part tariff is defined by an access price, a usage 
allowance, and a marginal price for any usage in excess of the allowance. 
Despite the prevalence of three-part tariffs in practice, there has been little 
research on the determinants of consumer choice and demand in such environments (for 
exceptions see Iyengar 2005 and Reiss and White 2005). Most of the literature on 
nonlinear pricing instead focuses on two-part tariffs (see among others Narayanan, 
Chintagunta and Miravete 2005, Danaher 2002, Essegaier, Gupta and Zhang 2002, 
Miravete 2002, Kling and van der Ploeg 1990, and Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva 
1987). A two-part tariff does not include a usage allowance and the consumer encounters 
a constant marginal price independent of her usage. In contrast, the allowance of a three-
part tariff implies that the consumer’s marginal price under a given tariff depends on her 
usage: The marginal price is zero in case her usage remains within the allowance but is 
positive in case her usage exceeds the allowance. We therefore expect consumer behavior 
to be different under two-part and three-part tariff pricing. 
When consumers sign up for a subscription-based service, such as cell phone 
usage or Internet access, they do not know the exact amount, e.g. in minutes or megabyte, 
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they are going to use in the following billing period. Instead they commit to a tariff based 
on their expected usage and their typical month-to-month variation in usage. They then 
realize their actual usage during the billing period. This temporal separation of decision 
making and consumption has different implications for the consumer’s bill under two-
part tariffs and under three-part tariffs. For a two-part tariff, the bill fluctuates with the 
consumer’s usage. If deviations from expected usage are symmetrically distributed, the 
consumer incurs on average the same charges under certain and uncertain demand. Under 
three-part tariff pricing, however, the consumer purchases a usage allowance for the 
access price and usage variation only affects charges if usage exceeds the allowance, 
leaving the total bill unchanged otherwise. Usage variation is therefore more likely to 
increase than to decrease a consumer’s bill on a chosen tariff. If the magnitude of this 
asymmetric effect of demand uncertainty on charges is large, the consumer prefers a tariff 
with a higher allowance than the one she would choose purely based on average usage. 
An asymmetric distribution of monthly usage deviations can further amplify the effect of 
demand uncertainty on tariff choice. Consequently, under three-part tariff pricing both 
average usage and usage uncertainty affect tariff choice. For the provider, pricing 
decisions based only on consumers’ expectations of their average usage ignoring their 
expectations of variation in usage would likely be sub-optimal. 
The usage allowance introduces an additional dimension into the provider’s 
pricing problem. For example, in order to make a tariff more attractive, a provider can 
change not only the access or the usage price, but also the allowance. This flexibility 
improves the provider’s ability to match consumers’ heterogeneous tastes, thereby 
helping reduce customer attrition and increase profit. Since models of two-part pricing by 
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definition abstract from an allowance, their ability to shed light on consumer behavior 
and its consequences on pricing under three-part tariffs is limited.  
In this paper, we aim at empirically exploring consumer behavior under three-part 
tariffs based on tariff choice and usage data of a German Internet service provider. We 
have three objectives: (i) We determine how usage uncertainty impacts consumer choice 
between three-part tariffs and its effects on consumer surplus and provider revenue. (ii) 
We estimate elasticities of tariff choice and usage with respect to the access price, the 
usage price and the allowance and thus explore consumers’ responsiveness to all 
elements of a three-part tariff. (iii) We derive implications for pricing from the provider’s 
perspective. 
To appropriately account for consumer behavior under three-part tariffs, a model 
needs to incorporate both the consumer’s discrete tariff choice given her uncertain usage 
and the subsequent continuous usage decision. Building upon the literature on 
discrete/continuous choice models (Hanemann 1984; Dubin and McFadden 1984; 
Hausman, Tardiff and Belinfante 1993), we develop a model of the consumer’s decision 
process under three-part tariff pricing. We relax three assumptions inherent in previous 
work. First, we account for consumer uncertainty about usage at the time of tariff choice, 
as in the two-part tariff model in Narayanan et al. 2005. Our model reflects the lag 
between plan choice and usage occasions that is typical of communications services 
pricing. Second, recent research has shown that consumers have tariff-specific 
preferences, in particular preferences for flat-rate tariffs (Train et al. 1987; Nunes 2000; 
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We therefore allow for tariff-specific preferences in tariff 
choice. Third, we explicitly model a consumer’s decision to switch to another provider. 
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In contrast to most research in subscription services that focuses on demand under 
monopoly, this significantly increases our model’s applicability to competitive industries 
such as Internet access, wireless phone service, or car rental. We estimate the model 
based on an extensive set of usage data from a German Internet service provider for 
10,715 consumers. We estimate tariff choice and usage elasticities and analyze the 
impact of demand uncertainty on consumers’ tariff choice, expected bill, and consumer 
surplus. From the provider’s perspective, we analyze the revenue impact of demand 
uncertainty. Based on our results we derive implications for pricing and customer 
management under three-part tariffs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce our data. 
Next, we develop and estimate a model of consumer tariff choice and usage under three-
part tariff pricing. We then discuss the model results. We analyze how allowance, access 
price and usage price impact tariff choice and assess the implications of demand 
uncertainty from the consumer’s and the provider’s perspective. We conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of the findings for pricing. 
 
2 Data 
Our analysis is based on confidential usage data from a German Internet service 
provider for a sample of 11,717 customers with DSL Internet access and consumer 
demographics (Table 1).  For a subset of consumers we have a total of five monthly 
usage observations. 7.6% of the customers self-identify as business customers. Since the 
provider targets primarily residential consumers and does not offer specific business 
tariffs, these customers are likely small businesses run out of the home whose Internet 
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use covers both business and personal use. We include these households in our sample, 
but control for differences in usage patterns. 
Table 1: User Demographics 
Characteristic Value Frequency
Customer Residential 92.4% 2,025 838
Business 7.6% 1,854 939
Gender Male 88.0% 2,056 866
Female 11.0% 1,718 720
Missing value 1.0% 1,303 506
Age below 20 2.0% 2,967 1,267
20-30 24.4% 3,232 1,310
30-40 38.7% 1,691 748
40-50 21.7% 1,618 642
50-60 9.3% 1,289 586
60-70 3.1% 687 350
70-80 0.4% 702 307
Missing value 0.4% 3,314 1,946
Education High school 4.6% 2,667 1,190
Apprenticeship 25.1% 2,284 908
Bachelor (Fachhochschule) 14.5% 1,524 686
Master 19.2% 1,378 624
Missing value 36.6% 2,269 944
Not working 6.6% 1,988 742
Self-employed 13.3% 1,897 832
White and blue collar 53.4% 1,854 769
Public sector 7.0% 1,389 638
Apprenticeship, military/ civil 
service, school student 7.1% 3,200 1,320
University student 12% 2,515 1,106
Missing value 0.4% 1,646 719
1 34.6% 2,269 990
2 25.0% 1,685 679
3 16.8% 2,154 940
4 16.4% 1,810 701
5 4.8% 1,959 834
6 2.2% 2,178 868
Missing value 0.0% 2,383 1,172
0 58.2% 2,007 846
1 13.6% 2,060 920
2 12.4% 1,821 686
3 3.6% 1,703 705
4 1.9% 1,809 715
Missing value 10.5% 2,339 1,015
N=11,717
Occupation
Number of people in 
household
Number of children 
in household
Average 
usage
Std. dev. 
of usage
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For Internet access, consumers can choose between narrowband (dial-up) and 
broadband Internet access. In Germany, DSL is virtually the only broadband Internet 
access technology, with only 2% of broadband users using other technologies such as 
cable. The four largest providers hold a combined 73% of the market as of September 
2004 (Forrester Research 2005). Internet access is provided on a monthly basis. The 
customers do not enter into long-term contracts with the provider, so a reassessment of 
tariff or provider choice is possible in any given month.  
In a given month, each customer in our data set can disconnect her service with 
the provider or, alternatively, choose one of three tariffs offered by the provider. Tariff 1 
has an access price and a monthly allowance. For usage exceeding the allowance, a 
marginal usage price is charged per megabyte (MB) transmitted. Tariff 2 has a higher 
access price and a higher allowance than tariff 1, but the same marginal usage price for 
usage exceeding the allowance. Tariff 3 is a flat-rate tariff with unlimited usage. We 
cannot tabulate the tariffs’ actual prices and allowances due to confidentiality 
requirements; however, usage allowances fall between 0 MB and 5,000 MB during the 
sample period and a typical monthly bill ranges between EURO 4 and EURO 30. 
Table 2 illustrates consumers’ tariff switching behavior within the current 
provider’s tariff menu. We also observe consumers leaving the current provider. The 
overall attrition rate is similar to industry-wide rates of about 1.8% per month (Gupta, 
Lehman and Stuart 2004). Similar to the provider under consideration, competitors offer 
menus of tariffs that are defined in terms of usage in MB. We collect data on tariff 
offerings of major competitors that are available during the consumer’s billing period and 
classify competitors’ tariffs into tariffs with a low allowance, tariffs with a medium 
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allowance, and flat-rate tariffs and report average prices and allowances in Table 3. 
Observing actual competitive tariffs allows us to model a consumer’s decision to switch 
providers in detail.  
Table 2: Tariff-Switching Matrix 
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Flat Rate
Tariff 1 85.7% 14.3%
Tariff 2 67.5% 32.5%
Flat Rate 0.0% 100.0%
Switch to ...
Switch 
from ...
 
Table 3: Summary of Tariffs across Providers 
Average fixed fee 
(Euro)
Average allowance 
(MB)
Average usage price 
(Euro/MB)
Low allowance 8.90 1,700 0.013
Medium allowance 20.40 6,300 0.013
Flat rate 28.30 unlimited -
Total number of tariffs across providers: 10
 
We next present an overview of consumers’ tariff choices and usage patterns in 
the data set to motivate the development of our discrete/continuous choice model. In our 
set of usage data, the average customer transmits 2,012 MB per month (Table 4); 
however usage varies significantly with a standard deviation of 6,008 MB. The standard 
deviation in usage per consumer is on average 846 MB indicating that within-consumer 
usage varies significantly across time as well. As Figure 1 illustrates many consumers use 
less than the allowance. Among consumers on tariff 1 (tariff 2) usage is 50% or less of 
the respective tariff’s allowance in transmission activity for 60.9% (52.8%) of usage 
observations, whereas for only 5.1% (5.0%) of observations usage is 150% or more of the 
allowance. 34.0% (42.2%) of users remain within plus or minus 50% of the allowance. 
The usage distribution shows a small mass point where usage equals exactly the 
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allowance. In addition, many consumers use less than their tariff’s allowance.  If 
consumers indeed choose their tariff based on both usage uncertainty and average usage, 
they are more likely to choose a tariff with a higher allowance and access price than if 
deciding exclusively based on their average usage, even though their usage on average 
falls short of the allowance.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Usage 
Figure 1: Usage as Percentage of Allowance, Tariffs 1 and 2 
0%
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Table 5 illustrates the extent to which consumers choose the least costly tariff 
based on their ex-post usage. The rows list the chosen tariff, while the columns list the 
bill-minimizing tariff for the consumer’s realized usage in her first available billing 
period. The sum of the columns thus represents all consumers on a particular tariff. The 
in Megabyte Minimum Average Maximum
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
observations
Average usage across 
consumers 0 2,012 121,286 6,008 11,717
Usage across observations 0 1,888 140,394 6,016 49,107
Standard deviation per 
consumer 0 846 55,398 2,292 11,297*
Coefficient of variation per 
consumer 0.001 0.495 2.236 0.329 11,297*
* Consumers with only one usage observation excluded
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diagonal thus represents consumers who have chosen a tariff that minimizes their bill in 
that billing period. Consumers in the entries below the diagonal have chosen a tariff with 
an access price and a monthly allowance above that of the ex-post bill-minimizing tariff, 
a fact that the literature has coined a “flat-rate bias” (Train et al. 1987; Nunes 2000; 
Winer 2005; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). In contrast, consumers in cells above the 
diagonal have chosen a tariff with an access price and an allowance that is below their 
ex-post bill-minimizing tariff. Across chosen tariffs, between 6.9% and 63.5% of 
consumers’ choices does not correspond to the bill-minimizing tariff. Further, a high 
fraction of customers chooses a tariff with an access price above that of the ex-post bill-
minimizing tariff. Only a small percentage of observations choose a tariff with an access 
price below that of the ex-post bill-minimizing tariff.  
 
Since the consumer chooses a tariff at the beginning of the billing period before 
using the service, the choice takes into account only the possible demand realizations. If 
the disutility from incurring additional usage charges beyond the access price ex-post is 
large, the consumer has an incentive to choose a tariff with an allowance that exceeds the 
ex-post bill-minimizing tariff’s allowance. As Figure 2 shows, a symmetrically 
distributed usage shock shifts both usage and total bill symmetrically under two-part 
Table 5: Tariff-choice Biases 
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Flat Rate
Tariff 1 93.1% 5.8% 1.1%
Tariff 2 54.7% 36.5% 8.8%
Flat Rate 23.7% 9.7% 66.6%
N=11,717
Best Tariff
Chosen 
Tariff
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tariff pricing. The expected bill is unaffected by the degree of a consumer’s usage 
uncertainty. Similar to the two-part tariff environment, the usage shock shifts demand 
symmetrically under three-part tariff pricing. However, the total bill does not fall with 
usage once usage is below the allowance. A symmetrically distributed usage shock is 
more likely to increase than to decrease a consumer’s bill. For two consumers with 
identical average usage, the expected bill of the consumer with high demand variation is 
higher than the expected bill of the consumer with low demand variation. These 
differences in the expected bill impact a consumer’s choice between three-part tariffs and 
in particular lead consumers with high usage variation to choose a tariff with a higher 
access price and allowance than their counterparts with low usage uncertainty. One 
explanation for the results of our descriptive analysis above, which is based on ex-post 
usage, is that the choice of a tariff with a higher access price and allowance is optimal for 
the consumer ex-ante, while deviations from ex-post optimal behavior reflect demand 
uncertainty. The demand model in Section 3 recognizes the ex-ante decision process in 
more detail. 
Figure 2: Effect of Uncertainty under Two-Part and Three-Part Tariff Pricing 
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The previous literature also proposes tariff-specific preferences and cognitive 
mistakes as factors that steer consumers to a tariff with a higher access price and 
allowance than is necessary ex-post. They are of importance if consumers prefer a tariff 
that leads to fewer month-to-month fluctuations in their bill, simplifying budgeting and 
financial planning or if consumers derive higher utility from not being charged an 
additional usage price (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). Other work has identified situations 
where households systematically overestimate their usage (Nunes 2000; DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2005). In our empirical work, we incorporate tariff-specific preferences, but 
do not investigate the source of such preferences further. We focus on demand 
uncertainty in explaining consumers’ tariff choices. 
To further investigate the role of demand uncertainty and motivate the model 
presented in Section 3, we conduct a regression analysis of factors that drive tariff choice. 
We focus on the subset of consumers who we observe for five months and analyze their 
choices in the last month in which they appear in the data. We measure demand 
uncertainty using the coefficient of variation of usage at the consumer level. We analyze 
the consumer’s choice between the two three-part tariffs and the flat-rate tariff in a 
multinomial logit model. Table 6 shows the results using tariff 2 as the comparison 
group. 
The first model analyzes the impact of average usage and coefficient of variation 
only on tariff choice, while model 2 also incorporates demographics. The included 
demographics are insignificant in explaining the choice among the three tariffs, with the 
exception of business customers being more likely to choose a flat-rate tariff than either 
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of the two three-part tariffs. The results confirm the likely impact of demand uncertainty 
on tariff choice: a higher coefficient of variation increases the likelihood of choosing the 
flat-rate tariff, relative to the intermediate tariff, whereas a lower coefficient of variation 
increases the likelihood of choosing the tariff with the lowest allowance, tariff 1, over 
tariff 2. The results on drivers of tariff choice are both statistically and economically 
significant.  
The marginal effect of an increase in average usage by 1 gigabyte, which is 
approximately one standard deviation of consumer usage, on the choice of tariff 1 is 10.1 
percentage points. An increase in usage for a given standard deviation in usage also 
decreases the coefficient of variation, which counters the effect of the increase in usage 
on the likelihood of choosing tariff 1. The net effect of a 1 gigabyte increase in usage on 
the likelihood of choosing tariff 1 is a decrease by 9.6 to 9.7 percentage points. An 
increase in the standard deviation of usage by 2 gigabytes, the typical variation in 
standard deviations across consumers’ usages, decreases the likelihood of tariff 1 being 
chosen by 2.9 to 3.7 percentage points through the increase in the coefficient of variation. 
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The first results from the analysis of usage uncertainty and tariff-specific 
preferences illustrate their potential importance in the choice of three-part tariffs and 
point to possible differences in consumer behavior under two- and three-part tariffs. The 
coefficient of variation in monthly usage is, however, only an imperfect measure of usage 
uncertainty. It does not control for differences in pricing structures faced by the consumer 
across months due to changes in the allowance for tariff switchers or changes in the 
marginal price if usage exceeds the allowance only in some, but not all, months. The 
Table 6: Impact of demand uncertainty on tariff choice 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Std. Err. Marg. Eff.
Tariff 1
Average usage+ -0.974 0.037 *** -0.101 -0.988 0.039 *** -0.101
Coeff. variation -0.266 0.152 * -0.032 -0.208 0.156 -0.025
Business -0.516 0.166 *** -0.067
Female -0.131 0.167 -0.012
Age -0.005 0.005 -0.001
Household size -0.014 0.037 -0.001
Occupation
School student 0.048 0.196 0.001
University student 0.134 0.166 0.013
Educational Attainment
Apprenticeship 0.012 0.090 0.001
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule) -0.107 0.098 -0.009
Master's degree 0.098 0.095 0.009
Constant 3.882 0.115 *** 4.262 0.257
Flat-rate tariff
Average usage+ 0.309 0.035 *** 0.005 0.337 0.038 *** 0.005
Coeff. variation 1.227 0.367 *** 0.007 1.276 0.382 *** 0.005
Business 0.786 0.426 * 0.008
Female -0.512 0.704 -0.001
Age 0.017 0.017 0.000
Household size 0.002 0.115 0.000
Occupation
School student 0.839 0.545 0.004
University student -0.109 0.600 -0.001
Educational Attainment
Apprenticeship 0.113 0.274 0.000
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule) -0.474 0.345 -0.001
Master's degree 0.368 0.293 0.001
Constant -4.343 0.332 *** -5.097 0.804
Log Likelihood
N= 6,342 6,215
Tariff 2 is the comparison group
*** p>0.01, **p>0.05, * p>0.1; +Average usage measured in gigabyte (1 gigabyte = 1,024 megabyte)
Model 1 Model 2
-1,816.005 -1,740,623.000
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following section lays out a model of tariff choice and demand that explicitly accounts 
for these differences in pricing structure while allowing for demand uncertainty and 
tariff-specific preferences.  
 
3 Model development and estimation 
3.1 Model Set-up 
Our model builds upon Hanemann 1984 who lays out a framework for analyzing 
demand problems that are mixtures of discrete and continuous choices. His framework 
applies both to discrete/continuous choice problems where the consumer’s discrete tariff 
choice is contingent upon her continuous usage decision and to multiple discrete choice 
problems where the consumer decides how many units of a discrete good to purchase 
(Kim, Allenby and Rossi 2002; Dubé 2004; Chan 2003; Hendel 1999). 
Discrete/continuous choice problems have been estimated primarily in the context of 
demand for electricity (Dubin and McFadden 1984) and telecommunications. Hausman 
et al. 1993, for example, employ a discrete/continuous model of demand to estimate 
penetration of local phone service in the US. Due to a lack of data on usage, they estimate 
only the discrete portion of the model, but incorporate the continuous choice consistent 
with utility maximization. Similar to Narayanan et al. 2005 and Economides, Seim and 
Viard 2004, the availability of detailed, consumer-level usage data allows us to fully 
estimate the interplay between the discrete tariff and continuous usage decision, however 
in the context of three-part tariff pricing.  
Each month, a consumer makes two decisions regarding Internet access. First, she 
chooses a tariff among the set offered by her provider or one of its competitors. The tariff 
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choice is a discrete choice among the available tariffs and reflects expected usage for that 
period. For the choice among alternative tariffs offered by the same provider, we assume 
there are no switching costs between tariffs. This is reasonable as a consumer can switch 
her tariff online.  
Conditional on the tariff choice, the consumer then makes a continuous usage 
decision about the quantity to consume. The model for consumer demand thus 
incorporates the two separate decisions and the interdependence of tariff choice and 
(expected) consumption. 
 
3.1.1 Utility Function 
The consumer has a choice between a set of J three-part tariffs. Each pricing plan 
is defined by a monthly access price, denoted by Fj for tariff j, a usage allowance 
measured in megabyte (MB) of data transmission included in the tariff at no additional 
charge, jq~ , and a marginal price pj charged for each MB of usage that exceeds the tariff’s 
monthly allowance. Within a provider’s portfolio, a higher access price is generally 
associated with a higher allowance, so that Fj < Fk if kj qq ~~ < . For the tariffs offered by 
the provider under consideration, for example, consumers have a choice between two 
three-part tariffs, denoted by tariffs 1 and 2 and one flat-rate tariff, with an unlimited 
usage allowance or ∞=q~ , so that 1F <F2<F3 and 1~q < 2~q < ∞=3~q . The pricing structure 
offered by the provider uses a marginal price for usage exceeding the allowance that is 
identical for tariffs 1 and 2. Such constant usage prices across tariffs are also commonly 
used by the remaining providers in the industry and by wireless telecommunications 
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providers, car rental companies, and other electronic content providers. Figure 3 
illustrates the tariff structure used by the provider. 
Figure 3: Tariff structure 
 
Bill
Quantity
1
~q 2~q
1F
2F
3F
p
p
 
 
We assume that consumer i making a choice of tariff j at time t maximizes the 
following quadratic utility function: 
(1) 
2 2
( , )
2 2
ijti it i
ijt ijt Oit it ijt i Oit ijt
qc d cq q d q c qU b b
ς = − + − +   
, 
with 
ijtq  – usage of DSL Internet access, 
Oitq  – consumption of outside good, 
ijtς  – observable and unobservable consumer and plan-specific characteristics, 
b  – demand slope, 
ic  – marginal utility of income, 
itd  – demand intercept. 
The consumer chooses consumption levels for qijt and qOit that maximize her 
utility subject to the budget constraint 
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(2) ( )it Oit j ijt j jy q F q q p= + + − ?  
where the price of the outside good has been normalized to one. pj is equal to zero for 
ijt jq q≤ ?  and on a flat-rate tariff and strictly positive otherwise. This entails a demand for 
usage qijt, conditional on choice of tariff j, of 
(3) .ijt it jq d bp= −  
The associated conditional indirect utility function is given by 
(4) 1( , , ) .
2ijt it j j i it j j j it j j ijt
y p F c y F p q d bp pV ς  = − + − − +    ?  
If the customer's usage volume ijtq  is below the allowance jq~ , equations (3) and 
(4) simplify significantly, but continue to imply bounded demand for usage. 
 
3.1.2 Tariff Choice 
A consumer's tariff choice is a function of tariff-specific preferences, ijtς . We 
decompose ijtς  into three observed preference shifters and an unobserved preference 
shifter, ijtε , that the consumer knows at the time of her tariff choice. We assume that itε?  
is distributed according to probability distribution ( )itP ε? .  
(5) 0 1 2
FR FR P
ijt j j i ijtI I BUS Iς γ γ γ ε= + + +  
We include observable and unobservable preference shifters to account in a 
reduced form for tariff- and provider-specific preferences identified in previous research 
(Nunes 2000,  Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We measure a consumer’s inherent 
preference for a flat-rate tariff beyond usage considerations by including the observed 
preference shifter FRjI . 
FR
jI  is an indicator variable that is one if tariff j is a flat-rate tariff. 
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We allow for differential preference of the flat-rate tariff by business and residential 
customers by including an interaction between the flat-rate tariff indicator and the 
business customer indicator, FRj iI BUS . In addition, we measure a preference for the 
current provider that reflects perceived quality differences, inertia, or switching costs. We 
include an indicator, PI , that is one if the plan is one of the competitors’ tariffs. A 
positive coefficient 2γ  represents an inherent preference for one of the competitors 
whereas a negative coefficient represents an inherent preference for the current provider 
over competitors.  
A consumer chooses her tariff based on her expected usage before making her 
usage decision. We allow for consumer uncertainty over usage at the time of tariff 
choice. We incorporate a usage shock, itν , into the consumer’s demand to reflect random 
variation in usage, which we assume to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
standard deviation iνσ . The consumer knows the demand shock initially only in 
distribution. She observes her usage shock in the second stage before making her actual 
usage decision. However, the usage shock is unobserved by the researcher throughout. To 
ensure that the demand system is well specified, the usage shock itν  shifts the conditional 
demand function as follows: 
(6) 
exp( )
exp( ) .
it it i it
ijt it i it j
d z a
q z a bp
ν
ν
′= +
′= + −
 
where itz′  denotes a vector of consumer characteristics and time trends that affect 
demand, such as household size, age, or gender. For given household characteristics, itz′ , 
and prices for a particular tariff, consumption on a three-part tariff depends nonlinearly 
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on the realization of itν . For values of itν  below ln( )j it iq z a′−? , usage is on the flat part of 
the tariff, below jq~ , where jp  is by definition zero. For ln( )it j j it iq bp z aν ′> + −? , usage 
exceeds jq~ . For a usage shock in the intermediate interval 
[ln( ) , ln( ) ]j it i j j it iq z a q bp z a′ ′− + −? ? , usage exceeds the allowance of jq~  at a marginal price 
of zero. At the then applicable positive marginal price, optimal usage qijt falls short of jq~ . 
Therefore, we set ijtq  equal to jq~  for usage shocks in the interval 
[ln( ) , ln( ) ]j it i j j it iq z a q bp z a′ ′− + −? ? . Figure 4 illustrates this mapping from itν  to qijt. 
Similar to the model developed in Reiss and White 2005, our model predicts a mass point 
in the distribution of usage. The usage mass at jq~  depends on the variance of the usage 
shock. The fact that in practice, there is large variation in individual consumer usage over 
time (Table 4) and the mass point of consumers using 100% of their allowance is small 
(Figure 1) suggests that the variance in unexpected usage shocks is large.  
Figure 4: Mapping from Usage Shock to Usage, Three-Part Tariff 
 
)exp( iitaz′
jq~
iitj azq ′−)~ln( ln( )j j it iq bp z a′+ −?
ijtq
itν
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We define 
ln( )j j it i
ijt
i
q bp z a
x
νσ
′+ −= ?  as the normalized itν  cutoff such that 
consumption exceeds the allowance for it ijt
i
x
ν
ν
σ > . Substituting the expression for the 
demand intercept into the indirect utility function then yields: 
(7) ( , , )
exp( )
2
i it j ijt it i ijt
ijt it j j
j
i it j j j it i it j ijt it i ijt
c y F x
y p FV bp
c y F p q z a p x
ν
ν
ς ν σ
ν ς ν σ
  − + ≤ =     ′− + − + − + >     
?
. 
The consumer chooses the tariff that yields the highest expected utility. Since 
tariff-specific preferences, ijtς , are observed by the consumer (but not fully by the 
econometrician), the expectation is taken only with respect to the usage shock, itν . The 
expected utility from consuming on a three-part tariff is: 
(8) ? ( )2
[ ] Pr( ) [ | ] Pr( ) [ | ]        
          Pr( ) ( ) Pr( )
1 ˆ               |
2
[ ]
ijt ijt j ijt ijt j ijt j ijt ijt j
ijt j i it j ijt j
i it j j j j it i it ijt j j ijt
ijt
V q q V q q q q V q q
q q c y F q q
c y F p q bp z a q q p
V
ν ς
ς
Ε = ≤ Ε ≤ + > Ε >
= ≤ − + >
 ′− + + − Ε > +  
= Ε +
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
.ijt
 
In equation (8) and the following exposition, a variable with a hat denotes the 
exponential of the original variable, for example ˆ exp( )it itν ν= . Equation (8) takes into 
account that if the consumer’s ex-post usage falls short of jq~ , she only pays the access 
price, jF , and no usage charges, whereas if her usage exceeds jq~ , she incurs charges of 
pj for each additional MB of usage in addition to the access price. From equation (6) we 
derive the expected value of iˆtν  given that ijt jq q> ? : 
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(9) 
? ?
ˆ ˆ| exp( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
it it j it it i it j j
j j
it it it it i ijt
it i
q q z a bp q
q bp
x
z a ν
ν ν ν
ν ν ν ν σ
 ′ Ε > = Ε + − >   
 +  = Ε > = Ε >   ′  
? ?
?  
The conditional distribution of ?ˆ ˆ( | )it it i ijtxνν ν σ>  follows a left truncated 
lognormal distribution with an expected value of  
(10) ? ( )20.5ˆ ˆ|
( )
i ijt
it it i ijt
ijt
x
x e
x
νσ
ν
σν ν σ Φ − Ε > =  Φ − , 
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function. The probability that the 
consumer remains within her monthly allowance is 
(11) Pr( ) Pr ( )ijt j it i ijt ijtq q x xνν σ ≤ = ≤ = Φ ? . 
Therefore, 
(12) 
( )
?20.52
[ ] ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( )1 .
2 ( )
i
ijt ijt i it j ijt i
i ijt
it j j j j it i j ijt
ijt
V x c y F x c
x
y F p q bp e z a p
x
ν νσ σ ς
Ε = Φ − + −Φ
 Φ −′− + + − + Φ −  
?
 
Given that the marginal price, pj, of a flat-rate tariff is equal to zero, the expected 
conditional indirect utility of a flat-rate tariff is simply 
(13) ( )[ ]ijt i it j ijtV c y F ςΕ = − + . 
The tariff choice is governed by the variance of the consumer’s usage shock 
2
iνσ and the relative costs of the tariffs. For example, in choosing among two three-part 
tariffs, a consumer prefers tariff 1 to tariff 2 if the expected conditional indirect utility of 
tariff 1 exceeds the one of tariff 2 or 1 2[ ] [ ]i t i tV VΕ ≥ Ε . This entails that the consumer 
chooses tariff 1 if 
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(14)
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The consumer trades off certain benefits in the form of tariff-specific preference 
gains and savings from choosing a lower access price (left-hand side) versus the 
uncertain utility losses due to possible charges for usage in excess of the allowance 
(right-hand side). The uncertain component depends on the variance of the usage shock 
and the likelihood of remaining within the usage allowance. The higher the variance in 
expected usage the more likely it is that the consumer prefers tariffs with a higher 
allowance of data transmission. This is particularly apparent in comparing the expected 
utilities of one of the two three-part tariffs to the one of the flat-rate tariff. A consumer 
prefers tariffs 1 or 2 to the flat-rate tariff 3 provided 
(15) ? ( )23 0.53 ( ) 1( ) 1 ( ) ,( ) 2iijt i t i ijtj j it i j j ijti ijt
x
F F p e z a bp q x
c x
ν νσς ς σ − Φ −′− − ≥ − − −Φ  Φ − 
?  
that is if the preference gain from tariffs 1 or 2 relative to the flat-rate tariff and 
the certain savings from choosing a lower access price exceed the uncertain payouts in 
case she exceeds her allowance on those tariffs. For tariff 1 or 2 to be the optimal choice, 
households with high usage variation need to have a high preference for these plans. 
Alternatively, the tariffs’ access prices need to be significantly below that of the flat-rate 
tariff to offset the utility penalties associated with exceeding the tariffs’ associated 
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allowances. Consistent with these tradeoffs, we show below that for the average 
household in our data set, the probability of choosing a flat-rate tariff increases with σνi. 
We assume that unobserved tariff-specific preferences itε?  drive tariff choice, but 
do not affect the distribution of demand. The two sets of unobservable characteristics, itε?  
and itν , are independent. Correlation between the unobservable characteristics arises, for 
example, if the provider ran user- and plan-specific advertising campaigns and decided, 
for example, to promote a flat-rate plan specifically to those consumers who exhibit large 
variation in demand. We do not observe plan-specific advertising and know from the 
provider that user-specific campaigns are not part of their marketing strategy.  
 
3.1.3 Provider switching 
In the data, we observe not only tariff and consumption choices by existing 
consumers, but also consumers who decide to leave the provider. One option to model 
the consumer’s decision to leave the provider is to assume that she disconnects her 
service completely. Under this assumption, the value of leaving the provider is simply 
normalized to zero, as in Iyengar 2005. This approach has the advantage of being easy to 
implement in model estimation. However, it probably does not fully reflect consumers’ 
actual Internet access choices. Prior to subscribing to DSL Internet access, consumers 
had to pay a fixed fee of EURO 100 - 200 for modem and installation. Given both this 
upfront investment and the preference for higher transmission speed that consumers are 
likely to develop, we expect consumers to switch to a different provider rather than to 
disconnect or “downgrade” to traditional narrowband Internet access. 
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Assuming that consumers who leave the provider switch to a competitor, 
consumer attrition can be incorporated by allowing each consumer a choice among not 
only the company’s three tariffs, but also those of the largest competing providers in the 
market. Similar to Israel 2005, we assume that each month a consumer becomes aware of 
the menu of tariffs offered by one competitor and takes this set of tariffs into account in 
her tariff choice. This is for example the case if the consumer views an online or offline 
ad of a competing provider. We randomly choose one of the competing providers’ tariff 
offerings that are available at the beginning of the consumer’s billing period and include 
the tariffs in the consumer’s choice set. The consumer then chooses not only between the 
three tariffs of the current provider but compares the expected indirect utility of choosing 
any of the competitor’s tariffs with the expected indirect utility of remaining with the 
current provider. The advantage of this approach is that it limits the size of the choice set 
and keeps the consumer’s problem more tractable than allowing her a choice among all 
competing tariffs. 
 
In summary, we specify the consumer’s initial tariff choice as a function of her 
expected usage, her usage variation and her tariff-specific preference shifters. The 
consumer chooses that tariff that maximizes her expected indirect utility in equations (12) 
and (13) where the choice set consists of all tariffs offered by the current provider and 
one randomly chosen competitor. The tariff choice incorporates the usage decision in 
expectation. After the tariff choice, the consumer then makes a usage choice, where 
demand follows the expression in equation (6). 
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3.2 Model estimation 
We use a logit specification for our discrete/continuous choice model. The 
estimation of the model defined by equations (6), (12), and (13) proceeds via maximum 
likelihood. We allow for attrition by randomly assigning another provider’s tariff offering 
to each consumer’s choice set. For a consumer who chooses any tariff of the current 
provider we estimate provider, tariff, and demand choices. The likelihood of seeing a 
particular consumer’s choices is the joint probability of her provider choice, NCitI , her 
plan choice conditional on remaining with the provider, NCijtI | , as a function of expected 
usage, and her usage, qijt, once usage uncertainty is resolved.  For consumers who leave 
the provider, we do not observe the choice of a particular tariff and consequently estimate 
only the likelihood of attrition, which equals the probability that the consumer chooses 
any one of the competing providers’ tariffs, or the sum of the choice probabilities for 
each competitive tariff in the consumer’s choice set. Consumer i’s contribution to the 
likelihood, lit, therefore equals:  
(16)
 
( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , ) ( ; , , , ) if  chooses current provider
1 ( ; , , , ) if  leaves current provider
NC
it i i i i i i ijt i i iijt NC
it
NC
it i i i
h I a b c f I a b c g q a b c i
l
h I a b c i
ν ν ν
ν
σ σ σ
σ
=  −
 
where ( ; , , , )NCit i i ih I a b c νσ denotes the likelihood that consumer i stays with the 
current provider in month t. |( ; , , , )ijt NC i i if I a b c νσ  is the likelihood of observing consumer 
i’s choice to be tariff j in month t, and ( ; , , , )ijt i i ig q a b c νσ  denotes the likelihood of 
observing the normally distributed demand shock itν  in equation (6). For any candidate 
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values of the vector of parameters, ( , , , )i i ia b c νσ , the probability that consumer i chooses 
tariff j in month t is given by the integral of the distribution function of plan preferences: 
(17) Pr( 1) ( )
ijt
ijt it
A
I dP ε= = ∫ ? , 
where }   ][][{ jkVEVEA iktijtitijt ≠∀≥ε= ?  is the set of itε?  such that tariff j provides 
maximal expected indirect utility, as defined in equations (12) and (13). Assuming that 
the tariff-specific preferences itε?  come from a type-1 extreme value distribution yields 
closed-form multinomial logit tariff choice probabilities. We allow the marginal utility of 
income, ci, to vary by consumer by assuming that deviations from the average parameter 
values are distributed according to a mean-zero, independent Normal distribution with a 
variance of 2cσ .  
The advantage of the multinomial logit specification is that consumers’ choice 
between varying options can easily be estimated. Since the logit specification restricts 
substitution patterns between choices, we estimate a multinomial probit model to test the 
robustness of the results. The probit model involves more complicated simulation 
techniques to derive choice probabilities. If we allowed for switching to a competing 
provider, the size of the choice set would be large and vary depending on which 
provider’s tariffs make up each consumer’s outside option. To incorporate this setup into 
a multinomial probit model with correlated normal choice errors, restrictions need to be 
imposed on the covariance structure of preferences for the competitor’s tariffs. Given the 
great disparity in prices and allowances of competing providers’ tariffs this does not seem 
appropriate. We therefore estimate the consumer’s choice between the tariffs of the 
current provider and the option to disconnect completely, a total of four options.  
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We assume that itε?  is distributed according to a multinomial Normal distribution 
with a 4 4×  variance-covariance matrix εΣ . We use simulation techniques to derive the 
multinomial probit choice probabilities, employing the GHK simulator with 200 draws 
per household (Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994). 
Observing systematic variation in consumer characteristics and prices that 
translate into variation in choice and usage behavior identifies the model’s parameters. 
Given the tariff structure used by the provider, we only observe two levels for the 
marginal price, a price of zero on the flat-rate tariff and for usage on tariffs 1 and 2 that is 
below the allowance jq~ , and a positive price for tariffs 1 and 2. The usage choices of 
observationally equivalent consumers under these two price levels identify the price 
coefficient. 
 
4 Implications for pricing Internet access 
4.1 Model results 
Our model results include parameter estimates both for the logit and for the probit 
estimation. We use one observation for each household in the sample selecting each 
household’s third billing period. This results in a total of 10,715 observations. Table 7 
summarizes the results. Overall the two specifications yield similar parameter estimates. 
The parameters for tariff choice confirm that consumers have a systematic 
preference for the flat-rate tariff relative to tariffs 1 and 2 as indicated by the significant 
parameter estimate of the flat-rate dummy. This preference is significantly stronger for 
business customers than for residential customers. In addition, the parameter estimates 
that capture provider preference (-9.422 and -9.948) indicate a strong preference for 
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remaining with the current provider, consistent with the presence of state dependence or 
switching costs in the provider choice.  
Based on their tariff choice consumers choose their usage. Of most interest in the 
analysis of the usage decision are the demand slope and the standard deviation of the 
usage shock, σνi. We find similar estimates in the logit and in the probit specification 
with values of the price coefficient b of 1.664 and 1.849, respectively. In a previous logit 
specification we also modeled b as a random coefficient, but found its standard deviation 
to be insignificant in estimation. These results indicate that usage falls in the usage price 
and that consumers do not strongly differ with regard to their usage price sensitivity.  
We specify the standard deviation of the usage shock, σνi, as a function of 
household characteristics. In the probit specification, this is a linear function of 
household size, whereas in the logit specification we allow for σνi to vary by further 
demographics, such as age, occupation and whether a customer uses the Internet for 
business purposes. We find the standard deviation of the usage shock, and thus demand 
uncertainty, to vary significantly across households. The standard deviation of the usage 
shock amounts to 141.6 MB for the logit model and 126.7 MB for the probit model for 
the average household. It ranges from 8.6 to 99% of predicted usage, with a mean of 18% 
and a standard deviation of 4.6%. 
The standard deviation falls in household size, suggesting that high and low usage 
levels of different members of the household average out, and increases with age of the 
account holder. Hence, consumers are heterogeneous in the amount of usage uncertainty 
they experience. The results confirm our reasoning from Section 2 that unexpected usage 
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shocks largely drive observed consumer demand. In the next section we explore in 
greater detail how demand uncertainty impacts tariff choice. 
Turning to demographics we find that Internet usage significantly decreases with 
age and increases with household size. Usage is not statistically significantly different for 
the remaining demographic categories as well as for month-specific dummies.  
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates 
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Parameters for tariff choice
Flat rate dummy 2.714 0.738 *** 2.962 1.346 **
Interact. flat rate tariff - business 2.607 0.751 *** 1.887 0.950 **
Provider Preference -9.422 1.066 *** -9.948 1.085 ***
Marginal utility of income, c 1.256 0.365 *** 0.406 0.040 ***
σc 0.479 0.143 ***
Variance-Covariance matrix Σ=LL ’(1)
l 32 1.011 0.698
l 33 1.105 0.415 ***
l 42 0.508 1.160
l 43 1.523 0.717 **
l 44 0.943 0.771
Parameters for usage decision (2)
Demand Intercept
Constant 2.629 0.380 *** 2.533 0.499 ***
Age -0.016 0.004 *** -0.004 0.002 *
Household size 0.053 0.016 *** 0.004 0.026
Occupation
School student -0.096 0.206 -0.032 0.060
University student -0.129 0.272 0.023 0.047
Educational Attainment(3)
Apprenticeship 0.035 0.165 0.012 0.232
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule) -0.127 0.151 -0.029 0.235
Master's degree -0.030 0.180 -0.034 0.230
Female 0.018 0.145 -0.054 0.045
Business -0.218 0.259 -0.261 0.108 **
Non-work days per month -0.001 0.021 -0.045 0.025 *
March 0.002 0.151 0.063 0.191
April -0.026 0.138 0.114 0.176
May -0.029 0.143 0.126 0.191
Demand Slope
b 1.664 0.855 * 1.846 0.499 ***
Std. Deviation of Demand, σ ν
Constant 1.271 0.137 *** 1.272 0.047 ***
Household size -0.025 0.010 ** -0.002 0.014
Age 0.005 0.003 *
Occupation: University student 0.067 0.128
Occupation: School student 0.077 0.192
Business 0.060 0.137
Log-likelihood
N=10,715 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) We control for missing values by including an indicator variable for households with missing information.
Probit estimationLogit estimation
(1) We estimate five elements l 32, l 33, l 42, l 43, l 44 of the Choleski decomposition L  of the variance-covariance matrix to capture 
the correlation structure of the multinomial normal errors. The remaining elements of L  are normalized to L (.,1) = L (1,.) = 
L (2,3) = L (2,4) = L (3,4) =0 and L (2,2) =1.
(2) Monthly usage is measured in hundreds of megabytes.
-46,479.280 -44,804.124
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4.2  Responsiveness of consumer behavior to tariff changes 
4.2.1 Results 
Based on our parameter estimates, we estimate price elasticities for tariff choice 
and usage. Table 8 summarizes tariff choice and usage elasticities for the logit model. We 
find that the choice elasticity of tariff 1 with respect to the access price is –0.510. 
Demand for tariff 1 is much more inelastic than that of tariffs 2 and 3, with elasticities of 
–10.788 and –4.453, respectively. Given the estimated high preference for the chosen 
provider, the menu of plans offered by the provider is more attractive than switching to a 
competitor. Among those tariffs, consumers on tariff 1 can only switch to a tariff with a 
higher access price and allowance in response to a price increase. Thus, among tariff 1 
users only those consumers with relatively high usage find such a switch attractive. We 
have shown above that this group of users is small as many tariff 1 customers use far less 
than the allowance. In contrast, when the access price of tariff 2 increases, consumers 
have the option to downgrade to tariff 1 or upgrade to tariff 3 to remain at comparable 
utility levels. Thus, the elasticity of tariff 2 is relatively high. Similar to consumers on 
tariff 2, consumers on the flat-rate tariff can downgrade their tariff to tariff 2 in response 
to an increase in access price, but cannot increase their utility by upgrading to a tariff 
with a higher allowance. This explains why the elasticity of the flat-rate tariff is below 
the elasticity of the three-part tariff. Whereas the elasticity with respect to the access 
price of the three-part tariff with the lowest access price is thus relatively low, the 
elasticity of the remaining tariffs is far higher and exceeds the elasticity of two-part 
tariffs. Previous work has found tariff choice elasticities under two-part tariffs for local 
telephone service from 0.46−  to 2.19−  (Train et al. 1987; Danaher 2002). The relatively 
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high price elasticities also suggest that the provider does not choose profit-maximizing 
prices.  
The tariff choice elasticity with respect to the usage price is –1.225 for tariff 1, 
and thus in absolute value higher than elasticities estimated by Train et al. 1987 in the 
range of –0.20 to –0.41, but similar to more recent results by Narayanan et al. 2005 of 
-1.0 to –1.8. A 1% usage price increase lowers the probability of choosing tariff 1 by 
1.2%. Demand for tariff 2 is more elastic. A 1% increase in usage price decreases the 
tariff choice probability by 6.4%. Again, in contrast to consumers on tariff 1, consumers 
on tariff 2 can both upgrade and downgrade their chosen tariff explaining differences in 
elasticities between both tariffs. Changes in the access price, however, have much larger 
effects on the choice of tariff 2 than changes in the usage price.  
We also find that usage is relatively inelastic to changes in the usage price, with 
average usage price elasticity across households of –0.068. This is below results of 
previous research on two-part tariff pricing that has found elasticities in the context of 
local telephone service ranging between –0.10 and –0.75 (Park, Wetzel and Mitchell 
1983; Train et al. 1987; Hobson and Spady 1988; Kridel 1988; Kling and van der Ploeg 
1990; and Kridel, Rappoport and Taylor 2002) or as large as –1.70 to 2.50−  (Narayanan 
et al. 2005).  
In contrast to the analysis of two-part tariff pricing we can also provide results on 
the tariff choice elasticity with respect to changes in the allowance. We find elasticities of 
0.461 for choice of tariff 1 and 5.453 for choice of tariff 2, indicating that in response to 
an increase in each tariff’s allowance, consumers switch to the tariff, primarily from the 
neighboring tariff. Tariff 2’s share increases proportionately more than tariff 1’s since an 
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increase in its allowance makes tariff 2 more attractive to consumers on both tariff 1 and 
the flat-rate tariff. In fact, increasing the allowance of tariff 1 and tariff 2 by 100 MB 
increases the respective tariff’s overall share of consumers by 2.3% for tariff 1 and 10.9% 
for tariff 2.  
In addition, we analyze the elasticity of usage with respect to changes in the 
allowance. We find elasticities of 0.295 for tariff 1 and 0.390 for tariff 2. This result is 
interesting from two perspectives. First, the effect of changes in the allowance on usage 
is larger than the effect of changes in usage price on usage (-0.068). This confirms that 
the allowance plays a relevant role in consumer behavior under three-part tariffs. Second, 
we find that changes in the allowance affect tariff choice more than usage which is in line 
with our previous results that the elements of a three-part tariff are particularly relevant in 
tariff choice but less in determining the actual usage volume. 
Table 8: Summary of Price Elasticities 
Elasticity of with respect to Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Flat rate Overall
Tariff choice Access price -0.510 -10.788 -4.453
Tariff choice Usage price -1.225 -6.351
Tariff choice Allowance 0.461 5.453
Usage Usage price -0.068
Usage Allowance 0.295 0.390
N=10,715
Tariff
 
 
To further illustrate the effect of changes in the three components of a three-part 
tariff on consumer behavior we consider the effect of varying different components of the 
three-part tariffs on various consumer types. We vary the components such that the 
consumer bill changes by the same amount. First, consider a consumer whose usage is at 
1,000 MB above the allowance on tariff 2. For this type of consumer, a 1% increase in 
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tariff 2’s access price and a 1% increase in the usage price have the same effect on her 
bill on tariff 2. However, the increase of the access price decreases the predicted 
probability of choosing tariff 2 by 10.8% whereas the increase in usage price decreases 
the predicted probability of choosing tariff 2 only by 6.3%. Next, consider a low-usage 
consumer whose usage exceeds the allowance on tariff 1 by 1,000 MB. Decreasing tariff 
1’s access price by 3.5% and increasing its allowance by 1% entail identical effects on 
her bill on tariff 1. Lowering the access price, however, increases the probability of 
choosing tariff 1 by 1.8% whereas increasing the allowance increases the probability of 
choosing tariff 1 only by 0.5%. Results of both counterfactuals thus illustrate that under 
three-part tariff pricing consumers are particularly responsive to changes in the access 
price compared to changes in the allowance and in the usage price. 
Our analysis of tariff choice and usage elasticities with respect to the three price 
components of a three-part tariff provides additional support that consumer behavior 
differs significantly under two- and three-part tariffs. Whereas a consumer’s tariff choice 
and usage decision under a two-part tariff is driven by access and usage price, we find 
that these decisions in the context of three-part tariffs are primarily driven by access price 
comparisons and less so by allowance and usage price. One reason for this result is that 
under a three-part tariff, the average user assesses the probability of exceeding the 
allowance to be small and consequently chooses a tariff primarily based on the access 
price and the allowance but less so based on the usage price. 
4.2.2 Implications 
Our results on tariff choice and usage elasticities under three-part tariff pricing 
have two implications for the provider’s pricing. First, the usage price does not 
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significantly change either the initial tariff choice or the ex-post usage. A comparison of 
our results with results from previous studies on two-part tariff pricing suggests that the 
usage price is less important in determining demand under three-part pricing than under 
two-part pricing. Consequently, for the given pricing structure the results suggest that the 
provider’s revenue potential lies primarily in changes of the allowance and the usage 
price. Second, when considering a decrease (increase) in the access price versus an 
increase (decrease) in the allowance, the provider needs to take into account the 
cumulative effect of such changes on consumer behavior across tariff offerings. For the 
tariff structure chosen by the provider, the effect of access price changes dominates any 
adjustment in behavior from changes in the usage allowance. Neither changes in the 
allowance nor changes in the usage price affect tariff choice very much. 
 
4.3 Implications of uncertainty for consumer behavior and 
surplus and provider revenue  
Our model estimation has shown that consumer demand uncertain is large, 
ranging from 8.6 to 99% of predicted usage, with a mean of 18%. In this section, we 
analyze the impact of demand uncertainty on consumer choice between three-part tariffs 
and the effect of changes in demand uncertainty on consumer welfare and provider 
revenue. 
4.3.1 Results 
To assess the role of unexpected demand fluctuations in the consumer’s tariff 
choice, we first numerically simulate tariff choice elasticities with respect to changes in 
the standard deviation of the usage shock, σνi. We find that a 1% increase in σνi decreases 
the probability of choosing tariff 1 by 1.404%, at the expense of a higher share of 
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consumers who switch to tariffs 2 and 3, with elasticities of 2.940 and 1.813, 
respectively. These elasticities represent the net effect of both consumers switching from 
tariff 1 to tariff 2 and to the flat rate and consumers switching from tariff 2 to the flat rate 
in response to the higher demand variation. Our numerical results are thus in line with the 
expectation that a higher usage shock variance, σνi, leads to a higher likelihood of 
choosing a tariff with a higher allowance.  
The usage shock that enters the indirect utility, ? exp( )it itν ν= , is log-normally 
distributed. As a result, an increase in the standard deviation of the underlying error, itν , 
increases the standard deviation as well as the expected value of ? itν , both of which affect 
the tariff-choice elasticities with respect to iνσ . The above results thus account for both 
effects. To focus exclusively on the role of usage uncertainty, we also compute tariff 
choice elasticities with respect to changes in the standard deviation of usage, holding 
expected usage on a given tariff constant. We rewrite the demand function as  
(18) ( )2
(1 ) exp( )exp( ) E( ),  with
E( ) exp( )exp(0.5 ) 1 ( ) .
ijt it i it j ijt
ijt it i ijt j
q z a bp q
q z a x bp
α ν α
σ
′ = + − − 
′= − −Φ
 
In this expression, α measures the percent change in the standard deviation of 
usage. For a value of 0α = , the equation reduces to the original demand function in 
equation (6). By including the term E( )ijtqα− , we hold expected usage constant for 
increases or decreases in the standard deviation of usage. The results in Table 9 confirm 
that even with a constant expected usage, consumers are more likely to choose a tariff 
with a higher allowance as usage uncertainty increases. We find an elasticity of –0.304 
for tariff 1, again balanced by positive elasticities of 0.391 and 0.425 for tariffs 2 and 3, 
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respectively. This illustrates that with increasing uncertainty, consumers are more likely 
to switch to a tariff with a higher allowance and access price and ultimately to a flat rate 
tariff, which is in line with our expectations of consumer behavior under usage 
uncertainty. The comparison of these results to the tariff choice elasticities with respect to 
iνσ  illustrates the role of increases in expected usage shifting consumers to tariffs with 
higher allowances in the initial uncertainty elasticity. The elasticities that hold expected 
usage constant are smaller in magnitude, but are driven by similar considerations to the 
ones discussed above. 
Table 9: Summary of Uncertainty Elasticities 
Elasticity of with respect to Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Flat rate
Tariff choice Std dev of usage shock, σνi -1.404 2.940 1.813
Tariff choice Std dev of usage, σq -0.304 0.391 0.425
N=10,715
Tariff
 
An increase in σq also affects a consumer’s expected bill on the three-part tariffs 1 
and 2. Figure 5 illustrates that averaged over all consumers, higher levels of σq, for 
constant expected usage, are associated with higher expected bill amounts. For example, 
an increase in the standard deviation of usage by 20% increases the expected bill on tariff 
1 on average by 13%. This results from changes in expected usage conditional on 
exceeding the allowance and changes in the probability of exceeding the allowance. For 
usage below the allowance, the bill remains constant at the access price. The expected 
bill of a consumer on a three-part tariff increases in σq because of the asymmetric effect 
of usage variation on the billed amount. 
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Figure 5: Effect of changes in σq on average expected bill on tariffs 1 and 2 
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An increase in usage variation, σq, thus increases both the probability of choosing 
a three-part tariff with a higher allowance and the expected bill on a given three-part 
tariff. This in turn affects provider profit and consumer surplus. Changes in provider 
profit stem from changes in revenue from consumers with widely fluctuating usage 
patterns, as well as associated cost considerations. A provider that wants to satisfy 
maximum demand at all times needs to provide higher network capacity if consumers 
have highly varying usage. Since the necessary usage capacity depends on correlation 
and inter- and intra-day fluctuations in individual consumers’ usage levels, assessing the 
profit implications of usage variation is difficult. We focus instead on revenue 
implications of increasing the standard deviation in usage. 
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between changes in σq and provider revenue 
and consumer surplus.  We compute expected consumer surplus and expected provider 
revenue by numerically integrating over the distribution of the unobserved usage and 
choice shocks. 
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We find significant changes in consumer surplus and revenue as consumers’ 
usage variation increases. For example, when usage variation increases by 20%, 
consumer surplus decreases by 1.8% and revenue increases by 1.5%. Consumer surplus 
reflects the changes in the expected bill and decreases steadily with increases in σq. 
Provider revenue, on the other hand, increases in σq. Even though at first sight the 
absolute numbers do not seem large, a windfall revenue gain of 1.5% that might translate 
into a similar profit increase is very relevant from a provider’s perspective. The 
magnitude of the changes reflects also the provider’s chosen tariff structure that awards a 
high allowance to consumers on the smallest tariff, relative to their average usage. An 
alternative tariff structure that uses the allowance more effectively as a means of price 
discrimination would entail more significant effects on consumer surplus and revenue.  
Figure 6: Effect of changes in σq on provider revenue and consumer surplus  
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
-40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Change in σq
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 re
ve
nu
e
an
d 
co
ns
um
er
 s
ur
pl
us
expected revenue per consumer expected consumer surplus
 
 
 
 40
4.3.2 Implications 
Our results on consumer demand uncertainty under three-part tariff pricing have 
implications for both provider and consumer behavior. If consumers have uncertainty 
over their usage, providers can derive revenues under three-part tariff pricing that they 
cannot derive under two-part tariff pricing. If the revenue effect is not completely offset 
by additional costs from providing a higher maximum usage capacity, providers of 
services where the choice and usage decisions are separated prefer three-part tariff 
pricing over two-part tariff pricing. In addition, providers have an incentive to target 
consumers with characteristics that are correlated with high usage fluctuations in order to 
increase revenue.  
Our results show that under three-part tariff pricing usage uncertainty is costly to 
consumers. A dynamic consideration might then be to smooth out usage over time. 
Because consumers with high usage variation have a higher expected bill and lower 
consumer surplus, three-part tariffs are less attractive than two-part tariffs.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a discrete/continuous model of consumer tariff and 
usage choices under three-part tariffs. This extends the literature on non-linear pricing 
that has so far largely focused on two-part tariff pricing. We estimate the model using 
consumer-level data on Internet usage. In addition, we allow for consumers to leave the 
current provider and switch to a competitor’s tariff. Thus, we make our model applicable 
to competitive industries. Our results show that demand uncertainty is a key driver of 
choice between three-part tariffs and steers consumers towards tariffs with high usage 
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allowances. For a given tariff and average usage, the expected bill of a consumer 
increases with her demand uncertainty and, thus, consumers with high demand 
uncertainty are more likely to upgrade to a tariff with higher allowance. Consequently, 
demand uncertainty decreases consumer surplus and, thus, is costly to the consumer. At 
the same time, providers derive increased revenues from consumers’ demand uncertainty 
that they would likely not earn under two-part tariff pricing.  
We also analyze the responsiveness of consumers to the different elements of a 
three-part tariff. Our findings reveal that for the chosen pricing structure, the access price 
is the main driver of consumer tariff choice, whose effects dominate any sensitivity to the 
usage price or the allowance, possibly because the likelihood of exceeding the allowance 
of a three-part tariff is small. Consequently, a provider’s pricing should focus on the 
access price. We also find that consumers have a preference for flat-rate tariffs.  
Our results also allow a more general conclusion. Under two-part tariff pricing 
providers traditionally discriminate prices based on expected usage. The allowance as an 
additional element of pricing under three-part tariffs, however, allows providers to set 
prices that discriminate not only over average usage, but also over variation in usage. 
Providers can thereby account for consumer uncertainty over usage. One interesting 
avenue for future research is to further examine price-setting in such two-dimensional 
non-linear pricing problems and in particular determine optimal intervals between 
different tariffs’ access price and allowance combinations. 
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